Aviation and cognitive science researchers have identified situations in which the pilot's expectations for the behavior of the avionics are not matched by the actual behavior of the avionics. Researchers have attributed these "automation surprises" to the complexity of the avionics mode logic, the absence of complete training, limitations in cockpit displays, and ad-hoc conceptual models of the avionics.
INTRODUCTION
The FAA report, Interfaces Between Flightcrews and Modem Flightdeck Systems [4] , identifies issues associated with pilot's management of automation (pages 33 to 41). The report catalogues gaps in pilot's understanding of the capabilities, the limitations, the modes, and the operating principles and techniques of modem cockpit automation.
The report describes "automation surprises" where the automation behaved in ways the flight crew did not expect. As an example, the report cites Wiener's [I21 studies where fiequently asked questions ofthe of the avionics behavior: "What is it doing now?" "Why is it doing that?" and "What's it going to do next?" The report also describes differing pilot decisions about the appropriate levels of automation and the different assumptions made by manufacturers in designing these systems.
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These issues with the cooperation between pilots and avionics are demonstrated by airline policies that prohibit use of certain parts of the automation, and by pilots who choose not to use parts of the automation [3], [6] .
Researchers have cited the limits of human cognition, operational complexity, ad-hoc conceptual models of the avionics, and limitations in the content and form of cockpit displays and training materials as factors contributing to "automation surprise" events. Cockpit displays and training material are the primary source of the structure and content of the pilots' mental model of the operation of the avionics. The consmcts, grammars, and visual representation of this information are critical to the formulation of accurate, rapid, complex, flexible, and meaningful pilot mental models.
Content and Form of Training Material
Airfiamers and airline operators have traditionally avoided the conceptual model issue by only providing training for the basic operating techniques of the automation. Pilots are given the knowledge to perform certain "critical" tasks with the avionics and then required to develop their own mental model through operational "line" flying and the operator manuals provided by the manufacturer andlor airline.
The officialsource of information on the operation of the avionics is the Flight Crew Operators Manual (FCOM). The FCOM is written and published by the airfi.ame manufacturer. Airlines typically republish adapted versions of the airframers FCOM with additional airline specific information, policies and procedures.
The FCOM is required to include a wide range of information: Frequently sections of the FCOM can be derived from earlier generations or manuals from other airplanes [7] . Following iteration and the review and certification processes, the final version of the manuals is made available for publication and distribution. Updates to the manuals are provided to pilots with additional information about new avionics loads and improved sections.
The authors of the FCOM are faced with a number of human-factors issues in capturing and presenting the information in readable, understandable formats. In addition, the FCOM is required to serve as both a means for educating the beginner as well as a referencesource for the expert operator.
CANONICAL RULE BASED DESCRIPTIONS

OF THE AVIONICS
The specification of avionics systems include numerous rules made by the designers of the system about how the aircraft should "behave" in certain situations. This decision logic can be organized as a canonical rule-based description, which can serve multiple purposes, including the generation of training material. Sherry [SI introduced a canonical rule-based, situation-action pair representation to describe the behavior of avionics:
Intention =f (situations, actions)
Where: situations => conditions when an action will be taken actions => commands, changes to displays or symbolic data structures
The situation part of the rule represents the overall operational condition that the aircraft is in. The situation is defined based on parameters that include: aircraft altitude, aircraft speeds, the location of the aircraft in the flightplan, the configuration of the cockpit, and state of the on-board equipment and sensors.
Given a situation, the avionics executes an associated set of actions. Actions include: pitchlthrustlroll commands, modification to the flightplan, and new speedaltitudehertical speed target.
This canonical representation also includes information on the intention of the action. This information is useful in abstracting complex, detailed situation-action pairs with an operational objective.
An example situation-action rule for an autopilot Vertical Speed mode is illustrated in Figure 1 . As is evident in this example, canonical situation-action pair representations of the behavior of autopilots are dominated by the descriptions of the situation. In the actual avionics software, up to 80% of the behavior of the avionics is based on conditional IF-THEN-ELSE constructs and logical equations. The remaining 20% of the behavior of the avionics is associated with repetitive tasks (such as closed-loop control of pitch), optimization (such as ECON speeds), symbolic manipulation of data (such as the Flightplan and cockpit displays).
Honor pilot request to maintain pilot entered Vertical Speed to pilot entered Altitude at pilo, entered speed. 
:tion:
Closed-loop control of vertical speed using pitch Closed-loop control of speed using throttles Flight Mode Annunciation "THRUST I VS"
Example situation-action rule for autopilot vertical speed mode. Complete and Approximate Descriptions of Behavior A canonical situation-action pair description of the behavior of a system is considered to be complete when all the possible situations that can occur in a mission are included in the description. 
RULE-BASED DESCRIPTION OF THE VERTICAL SPEED PITCH MODES OF A MODERN AUTOPILOT
Autopilots in modern "glass cockpits" include modes of operation that coordinate control of the pitch and thrust axes. Level Change, Altitude Capture, Altitude Hold, and Vertical SpeedRlight Path Angle pitch modes are known as the Cruise Pitch Modes. These pitch modes are available when the aircraft is greater than 400 ft AGL when the Radio Altitude is valid and Takeoff, Go Around, Windshear pitch modes are not engaged (or at any altitude when Radio Altitude is not valid and Takeoff, Go Around, Windshear pitch modes are not engaged).
A cruise pitch mode may be engaged, disengaged or inhibited from engaging. Hutchins [6] has examined pilot difficulty in determining which criteria have been satisfied.
A total of 252 mission situations affect the cruise pitch modes. These 25 scenarios are based on 62 parameters. The engagement/ disengagement situations and the number of parameters used in the rules for each cruise pitch mode are summarized in Table 2 . The rules for engagement/ disengagement of Level Change are the simplest. The rules for the engagemenddisengagement of Altitude Hold are the most complex.
Summary of Rules in Autopilot VS/FPA mode. Table 2 A typical description in the FCOM of the operation of the Vertical Speed Mode for a modem autopilot is illustrated in the left side "boxed section of Figure 2 .
Mixed Content Descriptions
The 
Buried Rule-based Description
The FCOM description of behavior of the Vertical Speed Mode is included in narrative form. The conditional rules for operation, underlined in Figure 2 , are not highlighted and difficult to separate into rules.
Given the incomplete nature of the training materials and the type of training that is currently given, currently pilots receive insufficient knowledge for the development of complete and accurate mental models of the avionics.
Approximate Descriptions
The current FCOM description of the behavior of the Vertical Speed Mode is an approximate and incomplete description. The FCOM includes 12 of the 16 situations in the actual software for engagement of the mode, and 4 of the 12 situations in the actual software in which the selection of the mode is inhibited or in which the mode is automatically disengaged.
The FCOM description of behavior is based on 9 parameters. The description of behavior of the avionics software is based on 12 parameters. It is easy to see that it is extremely difficult for a pilot to develop an accurate mental model of the avionics without a complete and accurate description of the behavior of the avionics.
Viewing these parameters, it is evident that the operational complexity in the behavior of the autopilot is necessary given the constraints in aviation. The behavior of the autopilot is determined by parameters that represent the environment (terrain and weather), aircraft dynamics, pilot delegation of authority to the automation, operational procedures, and technologies that enhance capacity and safety (e.g. glideslope). Therefore, reduction in operational complexity would be possible only with a reduction in functionality.
CONCLUSIONS
A reduction in perceived complexity may be achieved by reducing or eliminating differences between pilots' operational models and the operational models encoded in the autopilot. Complete rule-based descriptions of the behavior of the autopilot provide the basis for understanding the perceived complexity of the autopilots, differences between pilot and autopilot conceptual models, and the limitations in training materials and cockpit displays.
The most powerful means pilots have of learning the behavior of the autopilot is through observation. When the cockpit displays do not annunciate a complete canonical intention-situation-action behavior of the autopilot, the pilot is left to create approximate models of the autopilot's behavior. Due to the nature of the logical, decision-making of situation assessment, it is very difficult to generalize behavior in a meaningful way. Small changes in the value of a parameter used in situation assessment can result in significantly different theories of complex skill acquisition [ 11 suggest that it is reasonable to assume that pilots can learn to anticipate and monitor the behavior of large rule-based systems.
Typical users of PC spreadsheets make use of approximately 300 rules. Grand master chess players (those who have studied chess intensely for at least 10 years) have mental-models that include 10, 000 to 100, 000 rules of behavior [2] . There are similarities between pilot's training, both formal and on-the-job, and the types of training which office automation users and chess players perform that strengthens this assertion.
